International Robust Disagreement by Colacito, Riccardo & Croce, Mariano M.
International Robust Disagreement
By Riccardo Colacito and Mariano M. Croce∗
We characterize the equilibrium of a two-country, two-good econ-
omy in which agents have opposite bias toward one of the two
consumption goods and fear model misspecification. We document
that disagreement about endowments’ growth prospects is a natural
outcome of this class of economies.
Why do countries disagree about their relative growth opportunities? In this
paper we propose an answer that relies on both consumption home bias and
concerns about model misspecification.
The economy is populated by two agents, home and foreign, each endowed
with the stochastic supply of one country-specific good. Endowments are i.i.d.
and less than perfectly correlated. In each country, preferences are biased toward
the domestic good. Trade occurs in frictionless goods markets and in financial
markets featuring a complete set of state- and date-contingent securities.
The assumption of consumption home bias is crucial to generate endogenous
heterogenous beliefs. When agents fear model misspecification, they slant prob-
abilities toward worst case outcomes. Since each country in our economy fears a
low supply of its most preferred good, the worst case scenario is effectively coun-
try specific. This results in different expectations about the growth rates of the
local endowments even in the case in which all goods share the same objective
probability distribution.
This paper builds on a long strand of the literature on robust control (Hansen
and Sargent (2005), Hansen and Sargent (2007)) and on the literature of risk-
sharing with heterogenous consumers with recursive preferences (see Anderson
(2005), Colacito and Croce (2011), and Borovicka (2011)).
I. The economy
Endowments. In our economy there exist two goods, X and Y , whose endow-
ments are stochastic Markov processes. Let st and s
t = (s0, . . . , st) denote the
realization of a random event at and an history of events up to time t, respec-
tively. We assume that endowments in period t are (i) time-invariant measurable






= (Xt(st), Yt(st)), and (ii) i.i.d., hence
π(st|st−1) = π(st). For each history st−1, let there be only two equally likely
states for time t: sHLt =
Xt(st)
Yt(st)
= k and sLHt =
Xt(st)
Yt(st)
= 1/k, for some k > 1.
Accordingly, we index all equilibrium prices and quantities with a superscript HL
or LH, depending on which of the two i.i.d. states materializes.
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Preferences. The economy consists of two countries, home (h) and foreign
(f), each populated by a representative agent with a preference for robustness as
in Hansen and Sargent (2007):
Ui,t(s
t) = (1− δ) logCi,t(st) + δT 1(Ui,t+1(st+1|st))
where








π(st+1|st), ∀i ∈ {h, f} .
The operator T 1 captures the attitude of an agent that chooses a worst-case
distortion to the conditional distribution of consumption in order to account for
the present value of an entropy penalty. This penalty limits the set of alternative
models against which each agent guards. The size of that set is constrained by
the parameter θ and it is increasing in θ, with θ = −∞ signifying the absence of
a concern for robustness.










where xi,t and yi,t denote the consumption of good X and good Y in country i ∈
{h, f} at date t. Since we endow the home country with good X and the foreign
country with good Y , setting α > 1/2 introduces a symmetric consumption home
bias across the two goods.
Markets. At each date, agents can trade goods and a complete set of one-
period-ahead state-contingent securities. At each date t > 0, the budget con-














qt(st+1|st)ah,t+1(st+1, st) ≤ pt(st)Yt(st)− ah,t(st),
where pt(s
t) denotes the relative price of good Y and good X, ai,t(s
t) denotes
country i’s claims to time t consumption of good X, and qt(st+1|st) gives the price
of one unit of time t + 1 consumption of good X, contingent on the realization
st+1 at t+ 1, when the history at t is s
t.
II. Solution of the model
Pareto problem. Efficient allocations can be computed as the solution to
the planner’s problem. The planner attaches nonnegative Pareto weights µh = µ
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i ∈ {h, f} to maximize
Q(s0) = µUh,0(s0) + (1− µ)Uf,0(s0),







Anderson (2005) suggests a recursive way to characterize this problem in a one-
good economy, and Colacito and Croce (2011) extend this technique to multiple-
goods economies. The insight is that the solution can be conveniently cast in
terms of a time-varying vector of Pareto weights. Let Mt(st) = µh,t(st)/µf,t(st)
denote the time t history st ratio of Pareto weights. The optimal consumption
allocation rule is a sequence of functions that maps a history st into a choice of














































∀t ≥ 1 and M0(s0) = µ/ (1− µ). By interpreting the Pareto weights as time
varying, consumption allocation rules have the above straightforward representa-
tion, and the Pareto problem can be written recursively. More importantly, the
innovation in the ratio of the Pareto weights is equal to the ratio of the incre-
ments of the home and foreign distortion martingales. This makes the allocations
functions of the history of disagreements on distorted probabilities.
Calibration. We calibrate the endowments to be equal to 100 in the low-
supply state and k = 1.03.1 The coefficient of risk aversion γ is set to 25 and the
subjective discount factor δ to 0.95 to reflect a yearly decision problem. Home
bias is embedded in the parameter α = 0.98.
1The properties of the risk-sharing scheme do not depend on the level of the endowments, as far as
they are bounded away from zero. We choose a level of 100 simply for numerical reasons. The parameter
κ = 1.03 is chosen to have a moderate amount of volatility in the growth rate of the two goods.
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III. International Endogenous Disagreement
The solution of the robust min-max problem results in the following agent-






















, ∀i ∈ {h, f}.
Since each of the distorted probabilities in equation (2) depends on the utility of
a specific agent, our agents disagree on the transition probabilities across states
of the world. To better explain this point, in the top two panels of figure 1, we
depict distorted conditional probabilities as a function of µt(s
t) =Mt/(1 +Mt),
a measure of the disagreement across our two countries. By comparing the left
and right panels of figure 1, it is possible to see that the distorted probabilities
are country-specific. This is a reflection of the fact that agents with heterogenous
preferences have heterogenous assessments of the worst-case scenario.
Robustness slants probabilities toward the worst-case outcomes. In our econ-
omy with multiple goods and home bias, however, the definition of worst-case
event changes endogenously and in an intuitive fashion. On the one hand, when
µt(s
t) is close to unity, the home agent faces the possibility of being alone in
the economy. In this case, she fears a scarce supply of her most-preferred good,
i.e, sLHt is the worst event. On the other hand, when µt(s
t) approaches zero,
the home agent faces the prospect of being wiped out of the economy. Via the
endogenous risk-sharing scheme, the realization of a high relative supply of local
good, sHLt , would reduce even further the future share of resources. That is, s
HL
t
becomes the worst event. The assessment of the worst-case scenario is perfectly
reversed for the foreign country.
The distortion of conditional probabilities has the effect of distorting condi-
tional moments of the marginal distributions of the endowments. The middle
four panels of figure 1 report distorted conditional expectations Ê(X) and Ê(Y )
and distorted conditional volatilities σ̂(X) and σ̂(Y ) of the two endowments in
the two countries. Distorted conditional expectations are the mirror image of
distorted probabilities. The preference for robustness tends to lower the expected
supply of one country’s domestic good relative to the other country’s good as a
function of the domestic Pareto weight. Conditional second moments are distorted
in such a way that (i) within each country the relative riskiness of the two en-
dowments is constant as under the original probability measure, and (ii) volatility
prospects are different across countries except when µt ∈ {0, 1/2, 1}. The bottom
two panels document that the distorted conditional correlations are unaffected by
the concern for robustness.
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Figure 1. Distorted distributions. The left (right) column reports distorted probabilities
and conditional moments of the home (foreign) country. The thin line refers to the LH
state, while the thick line refers to the HL state. The dotted line refers to the undistorted
probabilities and moments obtained when θ = −∞.
IV. Concluding remarks
We show that introducing robustness concerns in a complete markets, two-
country, two-good economy endogenously generates international disagreement
about growth prospects. Future developments of this literature should consider
the role of both financial and information frictions. A formal estimation of a fully
fledged model allowing for heterogeneity and capital accumulation would shed
light on the deep origins of international prices and quantities.
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